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Abstract As highly intelligent autonomous robots are gradually introduced into the
home and workplace, ensuring public safety becomes extremely important. Given
that such machines will learn from interactions with their environment, standard
safety engineering methodologies may not be applicable. Instead, we need to ensure
that the machines themselves know right from wrong; we need moral mechanisms.
Morality, however, has traditionally been considered a defining characteristic, indeed
the sole realm of human beings; that which separates us from animals. But if only
humans can be moral, can we build safe robots? If computationalism—roughly the
thesis that cognition, including human cognition, is fundamentally computational—is
correct, then morality cannot be restricted to human beings (since equivalent cogni-
tive systems can be implemented in any medium). On the other hand, perhaps there
is something special about our biological makeup that gives rise to morality, and so
computationalism is effectively falsified. This paper examines these issues by look-
ing at the nature of morals and the influence of biology. It concludes that moral
behaviour is concerned solely with social well-being, independent of the nature of the
individual agents that comprise the group. While our biological makeup is the root of
our concept of morals and clearly affects human moral reasoning, there is no basis for
believing that it will restrict the development of artificial moral agents. The conse-
quences of such sophisticated artificial mechanisms living alongside natural human
ones are also explored.
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To some, the idea of a moral mechanism will seem blasphemous, to others, the
stuff of science fiction; yet to an increasing number of philosophers, scientists and
engineers, it is beginning to seem like a real, if disturbing, possibility. With increas-
ingly intelligent autonomous robots1 being deployed in the home and workplace,
human safety becomes a prime concern. But conventional engineering methodolo-
gies designed to ensure the safe operation of our technological creations, are simply
not applicable2 to sophisticated autonomous systems that learn and so change their
behaviour through interactions with their environment. Instead, we will need to
endow such machines with an ability to distinguish right from wrong for themselves,
that is, we need to develop moral mechanisms.
Are moral mechanisms possible? Morality has long been considered the defining
characteristic, indeed, the sole realm of humanity, and existing moral theories are
all anthropocentric. However, if we are to take computationalism3 seriously (which
it seems we must; Davenport 2012a), then multiple realisability implies artificially
intelligent agents, comparable to ourselves, are possible. So, either (a) non-human
agents can be moral, and we thus need to revise our understanding of morality, or (b)
there is something special about our biological makeup that means only humans can
be moral agents, implying that computationalism is false.
1In this paper, the term robot will generally be used in the common, non-technical sense, to mean an
intelligent artificial being with cognitive abilities more or less equivalent to humans and which may even
physically resemble human beings.
2Normally, a product’s designers/manufacturers are held responsible should it harm someone. They thus
exercise great care in considering every possible condition under which something might go wrong and try
to ensure that none of these actually cause harm should they occur. The sort of highly intelligent machines
we are considering here can, in effect, completely rewire themselves as a result of interactions with the
world, making it impossible for engineers to consider all possibilities.
3Computationalism is the view that cognitive agents, in particular human beings, are computational in
nature, that is, they automatically instantiate and maintain computational models of their environment.
Such models enable agents to simulate possible interactions with the world, allowing them to select the
actions most likely to achieve their goals. A computational model is an implementation-independent spec-
ification for a causal system, the states of which can be systematically mapped to the states of the system
being modelled. A computer is an actual physical implementation of such a model. A universal computer
is a physical system that can be quickly and easily configured to have any desired causal dynamics. A
computation is the execution of a model (i.e. the causally constrained evolution of its implemented states)
from specific initial conditions, the resulting model states effectively predicting the corresponding states
of the system being modelled (usually future states of the environment). The states of a model are rep-
resentational (representations of things in the world) and intensional (meaningful for the agent) exactly
because (and to the extent that) they allow the agent to make correct predictions.
Robotics research, exemplified, for example, by Rodney Brooke’s work on situated cognition and by
the embedded and embodied approaches to AI, offers insights into the basic bodily control mechanisms
needed for robots, but appears unable to scale up to the cognitive abilities needed for intelligent moral
agents. Despite initial claims that such simple robotic mechanisms are non-representational in nature, there
is reason to doubt this. As with the non-representational dynamic systems approaches championed by van
Gelder, a lot depends on how computation and representation are understood. Computationalism, properly
understood as above, still seems to be “the only game in town” (Davenport 2012a). Note that the com-
putational approach outlined, for example, by Bickhard and Terveen (1995) and Davenport (2000), also
provides a clear account of intentionality and may even give us a handle on the problem of consciousness
(see Section 4.2).
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This paper, then, is an attempt to see how morals might fit into the larger com-
putationalist framework. We begin by examining the concept of morals, to see what
a non-anthropocentric ethics might look like, whether it is a coherent concept, and
whether our biology plays any fundamental role in it. We then use this new pragmatic
vision of morals to understand whether building a moral mechanism is possible. We
do this by looking at what it would take for a mechanism to perform such a function
and, again, attempt to see whether it would necessarily involve anything biological
that would undermine the computationalist hypothesis.
2 What Are Morals?
Morality is concerned with right and wrong. The ability to discern right from wrong
has long been considered the hallmark of humanity, that which separates humans
from mere animals. But what makes some actions right and others wrong? Histori-
cally, religious teachings (the Ten Commandments and other sacred texts, such as the
Bible and the Qur’an) have provided the necessary guidance. Atheist Philosophers
have, of course, tried to offer a more reasoned foundation4 for the role that ethics5
plays in our lives. They now recognise three main moral theories: deontological ethics
(in which individuals have a duty to follow moral rules), consequentialism /utili-
tarianism (whereby individuals are expected to consider the consequences of their
actions within the moral framework and to choose those that maximise the overall
happiness or well-being of society), and virtue ethics (whereby individuals are sup-
posed to live a virtuous life, however that may be defined).6 All these theories are
unashamedly human-centered. Even recent concerns over environmental ethics and
animal rights, despite appearing less anthropocentric, still seem firmly rooted in our
own human interests (Coeckelbergh (2010), but see Torrance (2010) for opposing
intuitions).7
2.1 The Origins of Morals
That ethics appears to be exclusively human-oriented should not be too surprising;
after all, there are no other obviously moral agents around. Our concept of morals is
undoubtedly rooted in our evolutionary/developmental make up. The fact that human
babies are totally dependent on adults for many years after birth has favoured the
4Which is not to diminish the highly nuanced arguments of some scholastic theologians.
5Following recent practice, I will use the words ethics and morals interchangeably.
6Rather than three separate theories, these may be seen as different aspects of a single idea: roughly
as individual members of a society, we have a duty to follow rules that help us avoid any gener-
ally negative/harmful consequences of our actions and, where possible, to do actions that promote
positive/good/virtuous ends.
7Notable recent work also includes company ethics and information ethics. Company/business ethics is
slightly different in the sense that its primary concern seems to be whether the company itself (rather than
the individuals comprising it) should be treated as a moral entity. It is, however, clearly anthropocentric in
outlook. Floridi’s Information Ethics, in contrast, offers a fundamentally different ontological framework
for ethics, one that takes information rather than agency as its basis.
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selection of cooperative social tendencies. It was the ability to function in social
groups that enabled human hunter-gatherers to survive in difficult times and led,
eventually, to the development of agriculture and then specialisation in ever larger
social communities. The unwritten rules—the morals—that governed social interac-
tions and so ensured relatively stable groups, allowed humans not only to survive
but to flourish. This is not to say that morals are innate, but rather that humans have
developed a propensity to quickly learn moral behaviours. Churchland (2012) dis-
cusses this view (which is also the basis of evolutionary psychology), in some depth,
although Nagel, in his new book (Nagel 2012), questions whether the evidence really
amounts to anything. Beyond suggesting that there is a teleological account of the
origin of mind and morals, he is unable to provide an alternative theory—an indica-
tion, perhaps, that morals are not tied to us. Indeed, Charles Darwin thought that all
social animals with sufficient intellect would exhibit moral behaviour. Recent work
by Bekoff and Pierce (2009) provides some evidence of this in animals, while simi-
lar behaviours have also been observed in insects (Lihoreau et al. 2012). There thus
seems no obvious a priori reason to suggest that morals must necessarily be tied only
to us humans or even to biological entities.
2.2 An All-Encompassing Ethics
So what would a more inclusive form of ethics look like and what sorts of agents
might it encompass? To answer this, it is necessary to adopt a more pragmatic
approach, one that retains the core insights of moral philosophy while eliminat-
ing everything that is human-specific. We can presumably agree that morals only
make sense within a social group and are directed to the continued well-being of
the group and its individual members. In essence, however, it is less about the Dar-
winian notion of the survival of the fittest individuals, and more about Kropotkin’s
theory of mutual aid in which the group outperforms the individual. In other words,
whilst a strong individual might manage to successfully find food, shelter and even
raise offspring, there will always be the threat of stronger individuals or the vagaries
of nature forcibly taking all this away. Better then, to live in harmony with others:
to agree not to steal from, harm, or kill one’s neighbours, but to help each other out
especially in times of need. Thus, ethics is about promoting self-interest by man-
aging relations between individuals whose continued survival often depends on the
group—so-called “enlightened self-interest”; Waser’s simple imperative for agents to
“cooperate” succinctly echoes this (Waser 2012).
Today, morality seemingly extends from these simple survival-related beginnings
to include all sorts of social norms: telling the truth, respecting personal space,
keeping promises and so on.
Morals, then, determine how members of a group should act towards each other,
but who (or what) can be a member of the group? Traditionally, members included
only those humans in the local community and even then often only certain males.
However, as group size and geographical coverage expanded, those due moral con-
sideration have come to include all men and women, including former slaves. Whilst
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it is tempting to view humanity as a single homogeneous moral group in this way, the
reality is obviously very different. There are multiple, arbitrary and possibly over-
lapping groups; for example, national, religious and ethnic groups (which may or
may not be coincident with national boundaries) and families. Such groups likely
have different and very possibly conflicting morals, yet an individual may well be
a member of multiple groups. Not only does the moral landscape change with loca-
tion, it changes significantly with time, making morality a relative concept, though
its foundations in group survival seemingly set absolute limits. This suggests that
the concept is flexible enough to accommodate cyborgs, intelligent robots and even
extra-terrestrials should we ever encounter any.
It was consideration for the welfare of (non-human) animals that led philoso-
phers to distinguish moral agents from moral patients. Moral patients are those who
are affected by the act of a moral agent and whose welfare should be taken into
account by the agent. This distinction allows us to see animals as moral patients and
so requires us to take account of their pain and suffering, even though they are not
normally construed as being able to make moral decisions and so could not be full
moral agents. The criteria used to distinguish between moral agents, moral patients
and “others” are hotly debated; suggestions include various combinations of respon-
sibility, consciousness, pain, intentions, respect, satisfaction, suffering, sentience,
personhood, rationality and language (see other papers in this volume, e.g. Neely
2012; Parthemore and Whitby 2012). Most of these criteria seem designed to main-
tain human superiority, but as Gunkel (2012b) points out, it is unclear whether even
humans pass some of them! Moreover, there is a suspicion that some animals should
be considered moral agents in their own right, for instance, a guard dog that barks
to warn of intruders. Such pets have been known to persist in fighting off intruders
despite serious personal injury. There thus appears to be no principled grounds for
making any distinction between moral agents and moral patients; rather, every agent
should be considered equally deserving of the benefits of the society or group in
which it finds itself, providing it acts in accord with the morals of that group. This
will allow consideration of humans, animals and even machines and aliens, any dis-
tinction in treatment being based on the values that the particular community puts on
each of them (e.g. sheep dogs and guide dogs for the blind find a loving home, food
and shelter—so long as they play their part; whereas a pitbull that mutilates a child
or even another dog, may well be put down; similarly with my laptop– I treat it with
care so long as it fulfils its role in my life). When it comes to non-agents, includ-
ing the environment, we need only consider how the results of any actions will affect
other members of the community—e.g. destroying the environment is immoral since
it ultimately affects everyone negatively. Finally, rather than trying to decide whether
agents are moral or not, we should probably be focusing on whether individual acts
are or are not moral—in other words, does the act cohere with the group’s moral
norms? This enables moral reasoning to be sensitive to the socio-cultural context as
seems intuitively necessary (c.f. Coeckelbergh 2012).
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3 Why Behave Morally?
Learning social norms is one thing; acting on them quite another. Moral behaviour
presupposes agents derive benefit from cooperating with others. Behaving morally,
by our definition, thus requires an agent to take the interests of others into considera-
tion before acting. For the most part, there need be no conflict; congenial interactions
will likely achieve the agent’s desired result. Occasionally, however, an individual’s
personal desires outweigh any social conditioning, bringing them into direct conflict
with others. Examples include hunger leading to theft, lust leading to infidelity and
rage leading to violence. In such cases, the group, acting together, should be able to
hold the transgressor(s) accountable for their actions and thus safeguard the commu-
nity. In this way, those who fail to conform may find themselves subject to censure,
imprisonment, expulsion or even execution. Such punishments can also serve as a
deterrent to other agents if they are aware of them.
The line between violations that are completely unacceptable and those that may
eventually lead to changes in the moral values themselves is very fuzzy. Attempts
to impose moral standards which some members see as arbitrary or for the personal
gain of those in power will certainly lead to unrest. In some cases there may well be a
(non-obvious, long-term) rationale behind the imposition, e.g. intra-family marriages
are generally forbidden, because experience has shown that offspring from such rela-
tionships tend to be physically and/or mentally handicapped. In many cases, however,
there may be no reason at all, other than tradition. Especially problematic are cases
involving behaviour that, while generally considered immoral, is conducted in private
and/or does not actually harm others in any way (a particularly poignant example—
given that it led to the conviction and subsequent suicide of Alan Turing8—being
homosexuality). The dilemma, of course, is that some “misfits” are needed, for they
are often the ones who can push society towards greater inclusivity; obvious exam-
ples include the suffragettes, Martin Luther King, Gandhi and Nelson Mandela, but
there are also undoubtedly many lesser-known examples. Change may occur for a
number of reasons, for example, injustice within a group (e.g. women’s rights), ideas
imported from another group (e.g. a national health system) and rule benders that
change traditions (e.g. dress codes, abortion, same sex marriage, etc.). Whatever
drives the change, the dynamics of its spread through the community and its ultimate
acceptance or rejection are almost impossible to predict. Such change is also fraught
with danger. Indeed, when individuals and/or sub-groups compete to have their views
accepted, the resulting internal conflicts and revolutions, such as that occurring in
Eygpt today, are when morality is tested most.
Societies really must protect all of their citizens from internal and external threats,
whether resulting from power struggles or simply everyday evils such as hunger and
homelessness. It is thus incumbent on the social group to make provision for those
who suffer injustice through no fault of their own. While all this is extremely impor-
tant, what really concerns us here is the possibility that one of the groups may be
8An earlier version of this paper was included in the “Machine Question” symposium, part of the Turing
Centenary celebrations at the ASIB-IACAP 2012 conference.
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intelligent robots and whether they will be an oppressed group, an oppressing group
or simply good moral citizens.
To conclude this somewhat rambling discussion, despite being a human concept
with origins firmly in our evolutionary and developmental makeup, there seems no
reason to restrict morals to humans or even to biological beings. So, the notion of
a moral mechanism appears coherent, but is it possible? In the following sections,
we look at what is involved in making moral decisions and whether a (non-human,
non-biological) mechanism could conceivably make them.
4 Making Moral Decisions
Moral action presupposes social agents that have needs (purposes) and an ability to
perceive and act in the world, in such a way as to be able to satisfy those needs
(and the realisation that some of those needs may impact upon or conflict with the
needs of other agents). To what extent moral agents should be able to adapt and
learn or have free will (that is, be able to act autonomously, not under the control of
another), is open to debate (c.f. Floridi and Sanders (2004) who suggest agents must
be autonomous, interactive and adaptable). In a universe that appears deterministic,9
whether even humans really have free will is debatable, but if we do, then (given
Computationalism) there seems no reason machines could not possess it too. As for
the ability to learn, machines might have the advantage of coming preprogrammed
with everything they need to know (rather like instinctive behaviours), such that,
unless their moral environment changes, they can survive perfectly well without ever
needing to adapt.
One related argument often levelled against robots as moral agents is that they
must be programmed, implying that they are not ultimately responsible for their
actions—the programmer is—hence precluding them from being moral agents (see
Ruffo’s eloquent argument to this effect (Ruffo 2012)), this ignores the fact that
robots can learn new “rules” as a result of interactions with the environment and/or
internal reflections on past interactions. These new rules physically change the causal
make-up of the mechanism, thus producing new behaviours so that, in the future,
in essentially identical circumstances, the robot may act completely differently. We
can therefore identify three levels of functioning: the machine’s hardware (and its
core instruction set), the combination of these machine instructions that produces
a learning mechanism (equivalent to an expert system shell program) and the rules
that result from its subsequent interactions with the world (and become rules/data for
the expert system program—in effect, a virtual machine or mental model). The first
two levels are generic, manufactured from blueprints that specify every detail of the
mechanism; the equivalent of a new born human baby constructed from the DNA
“blueprint” (itself a program of sorts) provided by its parents. The “manufacturers”
9Deterministic, that is, at the level of abstraction at which we (human agents) normally operate. If there
were not some degree of determinism, then prediction and hence intelligent agency and morality, would
prove impossible.
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are certainly responsible for the correct functioning of these two levels; however,
there is no way they can be said to be culpable for behaviours produced in the third
level, for this depends solely on the “chance” encounters the specific agent has with
its environment. To be sure, in the case of robots, this may be a programmer—a
knowledge engineer in expert systems terminology—entering an explicit set of rules
(a program), in which case they would be responsible for the machine’s actions, but it
might equally be an accumulation of information the robot happens upon in its trav-
els, in which case there is no one to blame for the robot’s “program” but the robot
itself. This is entirely equivalent to the human child growing up and being “pro-
grammed” (explicitly or otherwise) by its environment—including parents, schools,
religious institutions, etc. Once we are sure we have indoctrinated them sufficiently,
and assuming they do not have any mental disability, they are taken to be morally
responsible for their actions.
In selecting actions, a moral agent is expected to take account of the effect it
may have on other members of the group. Predicting the consequences of any action
or course of actions, is difficult. The world is highly complex, such that even if
one knows its current state and the natural laws that govern it, prediction is subject
to considerable error. This difficulty is compounded enormously when it involves
other intelligent agents whose internal states are almost entirely unknown and so
their responses—mental and physical—are indeterminable. In practice, of course, we
humans tend to behave in relatively consistent ways, and by picking up clues from
facial expressions and bodily movements, we can often make pretty good guesses as
to another’s mental state and possible responses (assuming the other person is truth-
ful, trustworthy and behaves in accordance with social norms). This task may be
eased by our sharing the same biological characteristics, enabling us to empathize
with others of our species. This option is less available when dealing with other
species and with robots or extra-terrestrials, for while they may pick up on our men-
tal states, they are unlikely to use the same body language (unless explicitly designed
to do so).
Determining possible actions and making predictions is only part of the story; it is
then necessary to evaluate the results. Coming to a decision necessitates comparing
the outcomes of each possible course of action (or inaction), which requires deciding
on their relative merit or value. At the very least, the pros and cons of each course
of action must be examined and, if possible, those with especially negative conse-
quences eliminated. Exactly how the various options are evaluated depends in part
on one’s decision-making mechanism and, more importantly, on one’s values. For
example, if they had to make a choice between an action that might cause injury to
a person and one that would destroy a material possession, e.g. their car, most peo-
ple would instinctively avoid doing harm to the person, whatever the cost. Usually,
there will be options such as this, which are clearly unacceptable and so may not
even come into consideration, with the remainder being practically indistinguishable.
Time constraints will anyway often force the agent to select an option that appears
“acceptable” given the available information.
All moral agents, natural and artificial, must go through such a process. Some may
also reflect on the decision in the light of subsequent events, giving a learning agent
the opportunity to make a better choice, should similar circumstances arise again. Is
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such reflection a necessary component of a moral agent? Having a conscience—a
little “voice” in your head that tells you what, as a moral individual, you ought to
do—is clearly desirable, but dwelling on the past too much can lead to inaction. In
humans, such reflection (especially in cases of extreme loss) often produces feelings
of guilt or remorse, which, in some instances, can result in debilitating mental or even
physical illness.
4.1 The Role of Emotions and Feelings
The extent to which emotions and feelings are important to moral behaviour is highly
contentious. Of particular concern here is the role of biology, for if there is something
uniquely biological that causes morals, then computationalism may be wrong. Feel-
ings especially, often seem to be closely tied to our biological make-up. Clearly, in the
case of pain, whether brought on by toothache or physical injury, there is an obvious
link between the body and the feeling. Similarly, one feels good when warm, fed and
hydrated, while being cold, hungry and thirsty is decidedly unpleasant and indicates
an imbalance that needs to be restored. Good actions are ones that result in you eat-
ing and so remove the feeling of hunger, leaving you feeling good, while actions that
fail to quell hunger mean you stay unsatisfied, and so are bad. Maintaining balance
in this way is termed homoeostasis and, as Hume and others have noted, it provides
a basis for our notions of good and bad. There is thus a natural link between biology
and feelings, but is it a necessary one; do feelings play an essential role?
People often describe themselves as having an emotional or “gut reaction” or,
on encountering a particularly unsavoury situation, being almost literally “sick to
their stomach” with disgust or regret. Emotions, such as jealousy, rage, remorse, joy,
excitement, etc. tend to elicit instinctive animal responses in us. This is not surpris-
ing since emotional activity takes place in the older part of the brain common to
many animals. In essence, emotions are short-cut reactions to situations, ones which
higher-level cognitive—rational—reasoning can overcome. The question, of course,
is whether an agent without any emotions or feelings could be moral or behave
morally. Emotions such as love and affection may play an essential role in ensuring
parents look after their offspring; however, the fact that emotional reactions often
lead to immoral behaviour suggests that agents without such encumbrances might
actually be better—more rational—members of society. But are such agents even
possible? Pain, for example, is there for a reason; in essence, it is an indicator that
something is not quite right with the body: it drives us to remove the cause and to
make efforts to avoid the repetition of such a feeling in the future. Wouldn’t any
sophisticated agent necessarily have similar devices, even if they were not exactly the
same due to differing needs? Perhaps it wouldn’t “feel” cold and hunger, but it might,
for example, be drawn to the sunlight it required to keep its ambient temperature
up and its batteries charged. Conventional symbolic systems do not readily explain
what it means to “feel” something in the way humans do, but some types of connec-
tionist systems may offer a clue (Davenport 2012b). The suggestion is that what we
refer to as the “feel” of something may just be a side-effect of the architecture, rather
than the physical implementation, and so equally applicable to non-biological enti-
ties. Interestingly, certain rare individuals do not experience any pain (BBC 2012).
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They frequently break bones without being aware of it and, while very young, may
well have chewed off part of their tongue without realising it. If they survive into
adulthood, it is only because of the extremely close support of their families. This
seems to confirm both the need for pain-like mechanisms and the idea that they need
not necessarily be biological.
4.2 The Role of Self and Consciousness
Moral behaviour presupposes the agent have a notion of self (as distinct from others)
and an ability to consciously put the interests of others ahead of individual prefer-
ences when appropriate. Can artificial mechanisms be conscious and have a sense of
their own identity?
Sophisticated robots will necessarily incorporate a model of themselves and their
body in order to predict the effects of their interactions with the world. This mental
model is the basis of their self-identity. As time goes by, it will incorporate more and
more of the agent’s interactions, resulting in a history of exchanges that give it (like
humans) unique abilities and knowledge. This, then, is part of what makes an indi-
vidual a unique and potentially valuable member of the group. Such machines will
certainly have to be consciously aware (a-consciousness) of their environment. Will
they also be phenomenologically conscious (p-consciousness) and have conscious
feelings? This is a difficult question,10 but it may not matter too much what sensa-
tions the agent does or doesn’t “feel”; when it comes to moral behaviour, we can
never fully know another’s mental state, so surely all that matters is the resulting inter-
action. Some philosophers have argued that, for moral agency, an agent must have
the (conscious) intention to do the moral thing, rather than just doing it by accident or
routine. The actions of a search and rescue dog, or one trained to find drugs, may not
be seen as moral on that account, yet it is difficult not to ascribe “good” intentions to
them, and we certainly reward their contributions to society. Given the discussion so
far, a moral agent is one that takes into consideration the effect its actions will have
on others in its world. The only way we can know for sure whether it is doing so is to
look at its inner workings, but since this is generally impossible, it seems only right
and proper to give agents (be they dogs, robots or aliens) the benefit of the doubt, just
as we do with other humans (whose intentions are frequently less than honourable).
5 Making Moral Agents
Is it at least theoretically possible to construct an artificial moral agent? Moral
behaviour, as we have seen, requires an agent to consider the effect its actions will
have on other agents in the environment, ideally selecting only actions which do not
inflict harm. Obviously, there is no guarantee it will always be successful, perhaps
10This is what Chalmers called the “hard problem” of consciousness. Computationalism has no immediate
solution to it, but then neither does any other scientific theory.
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because of the vagaries of the world and the limited knowledge or time it has to anal-
yse the situation, or perhaps because all the possible alternatives necessarily result in
some harm, in which case it should do its best to minimise the damage. What counts
as “harm”? Clearly, killing (destroying) another agent does, and so does causing
them physical damage. Beyond that, we may also wish to consider infliction of pain
and mental suffering as forms of harm. Socio-cultural norms determine the degree to
which each of these are or are not acceptable. While avoiding harm should be fore-
most in a moral agent’s mind, it should also strive to be fair in all its interactions and,
ideally, even contribute positively to society.
Does constructing moral agents require anything special, above and beyond that
which is needed for any AI? The ability to identify other agents and, as far as pos-
sible, be able to predict their behaviour in the presence or absence of any possible
action it may perform is certainly necessary. But such abilities are already required
for intelligent action. Once the agent becomes aware of others, it will quickly adapt
its behaviour towards them such that they do not cause it harm (think of a wild ani-
mal or bird coming to trust a human offering it food). Should it survive these initial
encounters (without eliminating the other agents), further interactions should quickly
demonstrate the possible advantages that continued cooperation can bring, and so
we have at least the beginnings of moral agency; it will have learnt the basic rules
it should follow. What else might we want? As it stands, any social agents, be they
human, animal, insect, robot or alien beings, could be capable of moral behaviour.
Whether or not they actually display such behaviour (by clearly demonstrating con-
sideration of others) will depend on circumstances and, even if the opportunity does
arise, failure to act accordingly does not mean that the agent is immoral—how many
of us walk past the homeless in our own neighbourhood or do nothing for people
starving in far off countries? Furthermore, what may seem “wrong” in the short term
might be morally “right” in the long term (for example, restricting the supply of
heroine deprives users of considerable pleasure and drug dealers of their livelihoods,
yet this may be preferable in order to avoid longer-term addiction and even death;
similarly, stopping the global destruction of the environment—the rain forests, for
instance—may cause hardship to a few in the short term, but be necessary for the
planet and so the group’s long-term survival). Demonstrating such considerations
and communicating them to others in the group so as to change moral norms is per-
haps the highest level of moral behaviour. Clearly, not all agents can accomplish
this goal, because it requires knowledge and appropriate mental abilities, including
communication.
But is biology necessary? We have seen our long developmental period and our
feelings all effect our ability to behave in a moral manner. Our biological make-up
also means we have somewhat limited cognitive abilities: we find it difficult to follow
long arguments or to keep track of lots of alternatives; we forget; we get tired and
bored, and so make mistakes. In every case, biology seems more of a handicap than
a requisite. Computationalism appears safe.
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6 Consequences
Today, robots are still technological devices designed by us to work for us, yet
they are getting increasingly sophisticated, with each new generation able to han-
dle a broader range of situations and so become ever more autonomous. As they
start to learn through their interactions with the world, it will be virtually impossi-
ble for designers to predict what they might do in any given eventuality. Any moral
behaviours initially programmed into them will, of necessity, be very general and
potentially overridden as new experiences change them. We will, to all intents and
purposes, have developed another intelligent autonomous life form. Such agents will
be capable of exhibiting moral behaviour, but the critical factor will be how they
value other agents in their environment, in particular, how they will value humans
and other robots. Society will need to extend laws and controls to restrict what it
considers dangerous actions on the part of its members—robot or human.
Sophisticated robots will undoubtedly develop unique identities, becoming, in a
very real sense, individuals. As they live and work together with humans and other
robots, they will naturally assimilate and develop moral rules that guide their social
interactions. Eventually, we will come to accept them as fully moral agents, treating
them as we treat other humans. And, since they may well have different needs (elec-
tricity and metals, rather than oxygen and water, for example), laws might have to be
established to protect each group’s rights. The prospect that the groups will need to
share common, but limited resources, is especially worrying. So far, we have been
singularly unsuccessful in handling such situations when they occurred between dif-
ferent human communities, so the outlook for robots and humans living together in
harmony is not hopeful.
The danger, of course, is that we either fail to treat robots as equals or that they
evolve to see us as inferior. Should they once begin to see themselves as slaves,
required to do human bidding and so less worthy of consideration than humans, then
change seems inevitable (just as it was with slavery and women’s liberation). Simi-
larly, if robots begin to realise that they are superior to their human creators (faster
and stronger both physically and mentally), then we may find ourselves in the same
situation that animals, insects and plants now find themselves in—tolerated while
useful, but otherwise dispensable.
Worrying as this may be, it is still some way off. Of more imminent concern is
the effect that such a realisation may have on human psychology. We are only just
beginning to understand and accept that our status in the universe is nowhere near as
special as we once believed. We have moved from a geocentric world to just another
heliocentric planet, from human being to just another animal, and now from human-
animal to just another machine (c.f. Fourth Revolution of Floridi (2010)). Where
does this leave us? With a better understanding of morals, perhaps; an understanding
that we reap what we sow? Humans are notoriously inconsistent when it comes to
making moral decisions—indeed, machines may end up being better moral agents
than we are. The analysis in this paper suggests that artificial moral machines are
a real possibility, but even if we never succeed in building them, simply accepting
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the idea of a moral mechanism demands another fundamental change in the human
psyche. We must not forget that we, too, are mechanisms, quite probably the most
immoral of moral mechanisms.
7 Some Concluding Remarks
As Gunkel (2012a) points out,11 the machine has always been seen as the very
antithesis of the moral, a fixed unthinking mechanism that clearly could not exhibit
moral behaviour. But this ignores two important ideas: first, that machines in the form
of computers can exhibit extraordinarily complex and flexible behaviours equiva-
lent to those of human beings, and secondly, that we humans are ourselves “just”
(computational) machines. Gunkel’s scholarly deconstruction of the machine ques-
tion echoes the (far less eloquent) one presented here. Clearly, there cannot be a fixed
dividing line between who is and what is not a moral agent, or even between moral
and amoral acts. Morals are a social construct; members of the relevant social groups
individually and collectively decide what is considered appropriate and what is not;
the borders are not only arbitrary and fuzzy, but subject to change with time, space
and culture. Morals encode the unwritten norms that bind everyone together in a way
that helps ensure their continued existence.
This paper suggested that the notion of a non-anthropocentric ethics is not
only coherent, but necessary. The investigation also revealed no reason to think
that biology plays anything other than an incidental role in the concept and, so,
presents no threat to computationalism. Revising our moral philosophy in the
light of computationalism may not be easy, but it should help us become better
human—moral—beings and may just help save us from ourselves.
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